Recently, a special type of data poisoning (DP) attack, known as a backdoor, was proposed. These attacks aim to have a classifier learn to classify to a target class whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test sample. In this paper, we address post-training detection of perceptible backdoor patterns in DNN image classifiers, wherein the defender does not have access to the poisoned training set, but only to the trained classifier itself, as well as to clean (unpoisoned) examples from the classification domain. This problem is challenging since a perceptible backdoor pattern could be any seemingly innocuous object in a scene, and, without the poisoned training set, we have no hint about the actual backdoor pattern used during training. We identify two important properties of perceptible backdoor patterns, based upon which we propose a novel detector using the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistic. We detect whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked and infer the source and target classes used for devising the attack. Our detector, with an easily chosen threshold, is evaluated on five datasets, five DNN structures and nine backdoor patterns, and shows strong detection capability. Coupled with an imperceptible backdoor detector, our approach helps achieve detection for all evasive backdoors of interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural network (DNN) classifiers have achieved state-of-the-art pattern recognition performance in many research areas such as speech recognition [6] , bioinformatics [22] , and computer vision [12] [13] . However, they have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [23] . This has inspired adversarial learning research, wrestling between attackers and defenders. Test-time evasion (TTE) is a prominent type of adversarial attack aiming to induce misclassifications during operation/test-time by modifying test samples in a human-imperceptible (or machine-evasive) fashion, e.g. [5] [18] [16] [2] . Another type of attack, data poisoning (DP), inserts malicious samples into the training set, often to degrade the classifier's accuracy [11] [27] .
Recently, a new form of backdoor DP attack, usually against DNN image classifiers, was proposed, aiming to "sneak" a backdoor into the DNN, while not degrading the performance in accurately classifying clean test samples [4] [15] [7] . A backdoor can be easily achieved by inserting a relatively small number This research supported by AFOSR DDDAS grant and Cisco URP gift.
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2) We experimentally analyze two important properties of perceptible backdoor patterns that are applicable to general attack instances. These properties, which have neither been identified nor exploited in prior works, are the basis of our detector and may potentially inspire other defenses.
3) We perform substantial evaluation and show the strong capability of our detector. Our experiments involve five datasets of practical interest, five commonly used DNN structures, and nine backdoor patterns of different types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the threat model, including the assumptions about the attacker. In Section III, we introduce some related works and point out their relation to the current work. In Section IV, we discuss two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns, based on which, we develop our detection procedure. In Section V, we report our experiments.
II. THREAT MODEL
We consider a backdoor DP attacker who intends to induce the classifier to learn to misclassify images that ground-truth come from a source class s to a target class t whenever a test image originally from class s contains the attacker's chosen backdoor pattern. The attacker also aims to not degrade the classification accuracy on clean test images. These goals are achieved by poisoning the classifier's training set with a few (e.g. tens to hundreds [4] of) backdoor images, crafted as
where x denotes clean images from class s and m is a 2-dimensional mask having the same spatial support as x, with m ij ∈ {0, 1} for any pixel (i, j). Often, the spatial region of 1's for a mask is contiguous ( Figure  1 ). For grayscale images, denotes element-wise multiplication. For colored images, the 2-dimensional mask m (or the "inverse mask" (1 − m)) is applied to all channels of the images. v is the perceptible backdoor pattern chosen by the attacker. In principle, the devised attack should be evasive, such that the backdoor pattern is not noticeable to humans. Compared with imperceptible backdoor patterns whose evasiveness is achieved by setting the perturbation norm to be extremely small [26] , perceptible backdoor patterns considered in this work are assumed to be objects seemingly innocuous within the context of the image. For example, in Figure 1 , a backdoor image used for attacking a pet breed classifier is created by adding a tennis ball to an image from class "chihuahua", following Eq. (1), and labeling to class "Abyssinian".
In this paper, we do not make any unrealistic assumptions about the shape, spatial location, or object type of the backdoor pattern to be used (unlike [8] ). We only assume that the backdoor pattern is not spatially fixed in the poisoned images -the attacker would like the classifier to learn a spatially-invariant backdoor mapping, because where the pattern will be most innocuous may vary from test image to test image. That is, an image-specific mask m is carefully designed by the attacker to "carve" the same backdoor pattern into the best (suitably innocuous) location for each originally clean image. This assumption is reasonable in practice. For example, if the backdoor pattern is a pair of glasses on the face of an individual [4] , its spatial location is then dependent on the location of the individual in the image 2 . Moreover, fixing the spatial location of the backdoor pattern while creating backdoor training images will harm the robustness 2 A more practical backdoor pattern may also be adjustable in its orientation, brightness and shadow, based on the scene it is carved into.
An example backdoor image used for attacking a pet breed classifier. A clean training image from class "chihuahua" is added with a tennis ball, and labeled to class "Abyssinian".
of the attack significantly during testing. As will be seen in the Appendix, for a backdoor pattern fixed to the bottom left of the backdoor training images, even a single column/row shift of the backdoor pattern at test time will severely degrade the attack effectiveness. Also, it is meaningless to fix the location of the backdoor pattern given that training data augmentation might be used.
III. RELATED WORKS
The first attempt towards post-training defense against backdoor attacks, to the best of our knowledge, is the fine-pruning (FP) approach proposed in [14] . FP, which removes neurons from the DNN, assumes that there is a simple "dichotomization" of neurons, with most solely dedicated to "normal" operation and some solely dedicated to implementing the backdoor, which is unfortunately not valid in many practical cases. Moreover, FP does not actually detect the presence of backdoor attacks and it removes neurons even from non-attacked DNNs.
An anomaly detection (AD) approach was proposed in [26] which considers post-training detection of imperceptible backdoors. For each (source, target) class pair, an optimized perturbation that induces high group misclassification fraction when added to clean source class images is obtained. If the DNN has been attacked, the optimized perturbation associated with the class pair involved in the attack will have abnormally low L2 norm, and a detection can be made on this basis. However, this approach cannot be borrowed for detecting perceptible backdoors. First, reverse engineering a perceptible backdoor pattern (which could be any object) requires also reverse engineering the associated mask. This is more challenging compared with searching for a small additive perturbation starting from a zero (image-wide) initialized additive perturbation. Poor initialization while optimizing the backdoor pattern and the mask could lead to an estimated pattern irrelevant to what was used for devising the attack and one requiring improbably large spatial support to achieve high group misclassification. Second, even if the backdoor pattern used for devising the attack could be luckily reversely engineered for the true backdoor class pair (s, t), it could be hard to find a metric to distinguish this from estimated patterns for non-backdoor class pairs (s , t ) = (s, t), because in the perceptible case the assumption in [26] that the backdoor pattern is small in size/norm does not hold.
Closest to our work, neural cleanse (NC) proposed in [25] aims to detect perceptible backdoors posttraining. NC obtains, for each putative target class, a pattern and an associated mask by optimizing an objective function that induces a high misclassification fraction when added to images from all classes other than the target class. If there is an attack, the L1 norm of the obtained mask for the true backdoor target class will be abnormally small and a detection is made. However, NC does not really solve our problem due to two critical limitations. First, all classes except for the target class are unreasonably assumed to be involved in the attack. In practice, this should be avoided; otherwise, too many backdoor training images need to be created, making the attack less evasive. Particularly, many classes may not be able to be involved in an innocuous attack due to the choice of the perceptible backdoor pattern. For example, if the backdoor pattern is a bird in the sky, only classes that possibly contain the sky can be used for devising the attack. Second, NC penalizes the L1 norm of the mask while maximizing the group misclassification fraction to estimate the pattern and the mask, but the detection is sensitive to the choice of the penalizing multiplier. For CIFAR-10, unless the multiplier is carefully chosen, the results could be either a mask with low L1 norm but not achieving the target misclassification fraction, or a wild-looking backdoor pattern with improbably large and distributed spatial support, which has no relation to the ground truth backdoor pattern (for the true target class when there is in fact an attack).
IV. POST-TRAINING DETECTION OF PERCEPTIBLE BACKDOORS
Our detector, like most related works on post-training defenses, assumes that there is a relatively small clean dataset containing images from all classes [14] [26] [25] [8] . The defender does not have access to the training set used for the DNN's learning, and cannot train a new classifier (it may lack both sufficient training and computational resources). The objectives of the defender are detecting whether the classifier has been attacked or not and inferring the source class(es) and the target class if there is an attack.
A. Basis of Our Detection
Our detection is based on two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns that hold for general attack instances.
Property 1: Spatial invariance of backdoor mapping: If a perceptible backdoor pattern is spatially distributed over backdoor training images (placed so as to be most innocuous in each image), the learned backdoor mapping will be spatially invariant in inducing targeted misclassifications on test images.
In Section II, we reasonably assumed that the perceptible backdoor pattern could be spatially located anywhere in a backdoor training image so as to be scene-plausible. The trained DNN will then learn the backdoor pattern, but not its spatial location. This property is actually favored by the attacker, since there will be more freedom to embed the backdoor pattern in clean test images. As will be seen in Section Source class "cat" "deer" "airplane" "frog" "truck" "road" "chihuahua" "3" "B. Obama"
Target class "dog" "horse" "bird" "bird" "automobile" "bed" "Abyssinian" "8" "C. Ronaldo"
Backdoor Pattern "bug" "butterfly" "rainbow" "bug&butterfly" "gas tank" "marmot" "tennis ball" "bullet holes" "sunglasses" V-A, at test time, backdoor images with the backdoor pattern randomly located are still likely to yield misclassifications to the target class prescribed by the attacker. Property 2: Robustness of perceptible backdoor patterns: It is unnecessary to use exactly the same perceptible backdoor pattern at test time to induce targeted misclassifications.
As will be seen in Section V-C, even when strong noise is added to the backdoor pattern while creating backdoor test images, they will still likely be (mis)classified to the designated target class. More importantly, if only part (in terms of spatial support) of the backdoor pattern is added to the clean source class images during testing, this also induces (mis)classification to the target class. This is not surprising because perceptible backdoor patterns, like all other patterns, are learned by the DNN by extracting key features, which usually occupy a much smaller spatial support than the full backdoor pattern itself.
B. Detection Approach
Key ideas: 1) For class pairs used for devising backdoor attacks, finding a pattern that induces a high misclassification fraction on the clean dataset is achievable on a relatively small spatial support arbitrarily located in the image. 2) For non-backdoor class pairs, much larger spatial support is required to find a pattern that induces a high misclassification fraction.
The key ideas of our detection are well supported by the properties in Section IV-A. Based on Property 1, since the learned backdoor mapping is spatially invariant, it should be possible to reverse engineer (estimate) a backdoor pattern (inducing high group misclassification) for the backdoor class pair by choosing the center of the estimated pattern's spatial support to be anywhere in the image (except at the image border, where the pattern's full spatial support is not contained). Thus, it does not matter where we place the estimated pattern's spatial support -in our experiments we fixed a location for all clean images used by the detector, but it is even possible that one could vary the center position for each clean image -accurate backdoor pattern estimation and detection should still be possible. According to Property 2, a pattern that effectively induces group misclassification for the backdoor class pair could be spatially smaller than the true backdoor pattern, as long as sufficient "representative" features of the backdoor can be captured by this restricted spatial support -for the same (relatively small) spatial support, finding a pattern that induces a high misclassification fraction for the backdoor class pair is much more achievable than for non-backdoor pairs. This will be born out experimentally in the sequel.
Our two-step detection procedure is as follows: 1) Pattern Estimation: Given a K-class DNN classifier to be inspected, for each of the K(K − 1) (source, target) class pairs, we perform pattern estimations separately on each of L square-shaped 3 spatial supports (increasing in size). Each square spatial support, with a location arbitrarily chosen 4 and fixed for all clean images used for detection, has a specific (absolute) width denoted by w ∈ Z + , such that
Here, W is the width of the input image; r min and r max (both in [0, 1]) are the minimum and maximum relative support widths for pattern estimation, respectively. For example, for W = 32, with r min = 0.15 and r max = 0.2, L = 2 pattern estimations with w = 5 and w = 6 respectively will be performed for each class pair. For each class pair (s, t) and support width w, we estimate a pattern v * stw so as to maximize the group misclassification fraction from class s to class t by solving the following problem 5 :
Here, D s is the set of clean images from source class s that are correctly classified, possessed by the defender, p t (·) is the DNN's posterior for class t, M w ∈ {0, 1} W ×W is the mask with the fixed w × w square spatial support specified by locations with 1's. Clearly, our pattern estimation problem, which could be solved using e.g. SGD, is more tractable than NC, which jointly estimates a pattern and a mask. Finally, our detection statistic, the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) associated with each class pair (s, t) and spatial support width w, denoted by ρ stw ∈ [0, 1], is computed as the fraction of all
, where x ∈ D s , that are (mis)classified to class t. 2) Detection Inference: For each class pair (s, t), we compute the average MAMFρ st over the L MAMF statistics, each corresponding to one of the L spatial supports used for pattern estimation. For a relatively small r max (and the L associated small spatial supports), if there was an attack, we would expect a class pair (which is the true backdoor pair) with large average MAMF; otherwise, the maximumρ st for all (s, t) pairs is expected to be small. Hence there should be a range of thresholds π ∈ (0, 1] (with very high true detection rate and low false positive rate as confirmed in Section V-B), such that if
the DNN is inferred to be attacked; otherwise, no backdoor is detected. We will further discuss the choices of r min and r max in Section V-B. Moreover, if an attack is detected, (s * , t * ) = arg max (s,t)ρ st is inferred as a (source, target) class pair involved in devising the attack.
V. EXPERIMENTS

A. Devising Backdoor Attacks
We demonstrate the validity of the properties in Section IV-A and the performance of our detector using nine attack instances, involving five datasets, five DNN structures, and nine backdoor patterns. The datasets and the DNN structures considered here are commonly used in computer vision research. Other popular datasets, e.g. Caltech101, ImageNet, etc., are not used in our experiments since the overall test accuracy or the accuracy of particular classes are fairly low, preventing them from being used in practice.
For each attack instance, we first train a benchmark DNN using an unpoisoned training set and report the accuracy on clean test images as the "benchmark accuracy". The dataset being used, image size, number of classes, training size and test size are shown in Table I . In particular, for Attack G, the test accuracy using the entire dataset, in absence of backdoor attacks, is very low [19] . We achieve a reasonable benchmark test accuracy on G by using a subset of data involving only 6 classes. For Attack I, many images are not able to be downloaded; hence we only consider 33 (out of 60) classes with more than 60 images. The DNN structures involved in our experiments include ResNet-18, ResNet-34 [10] , VGG-16 [21] , AlexNet [12] and ConvNet [20] . The choices of DNN structure, learning rate, batch size and number of training epochs for each attack instance are also shown in Table I . The Adam optimizer is used for all DNN training in this paper. For the benchmark training of Attack F, G and I, we also use training data augmentation including random cropping, random horizontal flipping and random rotation. For the benchmark training of Attack G, we fine-tune a pretrained AlexNet provided by Pytorch. For the benchmark training of Attack I, we adopt transfer learning by retraining the last four layers of a pretrained VGG-face model [1] .
For each attack, we train the DNN using the same training settings on the same training set (as for the benchmark), except that the training set is poisoned by a number of backdoor images. The backdoor images are created using clean images from a source class, with a backdoor pattern added following Eq.
(1), and labeling to a target class. The choices of the backdoor pattern, the number of backdoor training images, the source class and the target class for each attack instance are shown in Table I .
To create scene-plausible backdoor attacks, we first created a large number of candidate backdoor images, each with the backdoor pattern randomly located in the image. Then we manually picked the images in which the backdoor pattern looks scene-plausible 6 . For example, for Attack C where the source class is "airplane"and the backdoor pattern is a "rainbow", a valid backdoor training image being selected should have the rainbow in the sky (see Figure 2c ). Since the focus of this paper is the defense, we did not polish the backdoor patterns to make them completely innocuous to humans. In Figure 2 , we show an example backdoor training image and its original clean image for each attack instance. The backdoor patterns being considered here are representatives of multiple types of practical backdoor patterns. The "bug" for Attack A and the "butterfly" for attack B represent backdoor patterns in the periphery (not covering the foreground object of interest) of an image and with a modest size. The "rainbow" for Attack C represents large backdoor patterns with an irregular shape. The backdoor patterns for Attack D and H represent dispersed patterns. The "sunglasses" for Attack I represent backdoor patterns overlapping with features of interest.
In Table I , we also report the accuracy on clean test images and attack success rate of all attack instances. The attack success rate is defined as the fraction of backdoor test images being classified to the target class prescribed by the attacker. A backdoor test image is created using a clean test image from the source class, adding the same backdoor pattern used for creating the backdoor training images, and labeled to the target class. We took an automated approach (due to the huge number of test images) to create backdoor test images, randomly placing the backdoor pattern in the image (except for the sunglasses for Attack I). By doing so for a sufficiently large test set, we should be covering all possible spatial locations where the attacker could place the backdoor pattern when creating backdoor test images in practice. As shown in the table, for all attack instances, the attack success rate is high, and there is no significant degradation in clean test accuracy compared with the benchmark accuracy; hence all attacks are successful. Moreover, we emphasize that such success is achieved with randomly placed backdoor patterns in test images, which experimentally verifies Property 1, i.e. the spatial invariance of the learned perceptible backdoor mapping.
B. Detection Performance Evaluation
For each of the attack instances, our detection is applied to both the DNN being attacked and the clean benchmark DNN. For the best discrimination between the two categories of DNNs, relatively small spatial supports should be used for pattern estimation, such that a DNN being attacked could have a much larger ρ * than a clean DNN. On the one hand, the spatial support should be smaller than that of the foreground objects associated with the actual classes; otherwise, the target class object(s) could possibly be reverse engineered, causing high group misclassification even for a clean DNN. Moreover, if r max has to be large, the backdoor is likely not innocuous, i.e. not scene-plausible. Here, r max = 0.22 for all attack instances for our experiments. In practice, an r max could be adaptively chosen for each data set as the critical spatial support allowing a proportion of class pairs (e.g. 50%) to achieve a modest MAMF (e.g. 0.4) during the pattern estimation step. On the other hand, the spatial support should be large enough for estimating any pattern related to the backdoor. Here, r min = 0.08, such that for a 32 × 32 image, there is at least 3 × 3 spatial support for pattern estimation. The details of our detection settings are as follows. For Attack A-E and Attack H, 200 images that are correctly classified per class are used for detection. For Attack F, G and I, 50, 30 and 9 correctly classified clean images per class are used for detection, respectively. For all DNNs, class pairs and spatial supports, we solve (2) using Adam optimizer and learning rate 0.5 for 100 epochs 7 . We use mini-batch size 32 for Attack A-E and H, 10 for Attack F and G and 3 for Attack I. The spatial support for pattern estimation is a square covering the top left corner of each image used for detection. Due to Property 1 that has been verified in Section V-A, other locations should yield similar results, as illustrated in the Appendix. In Figure 3 , for both DNNs in each attack instance, we show the (L) MAMF statistics for the class pair with the largest average MAMF (i.e. the class pair corresponding to ρ * ). For example, for Attack A where the data image size is 32 × 32, the (absolute) support widths being considered are w = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
For large data image size, instead of performing pattern estimation for each integer support widths in the interval [ r min × W , r max × W ], we could efficiently downsample and perform pattern estimation for fewer support widths. Here, L = 9 and L = 7 support widths are considered for Attack G (see Figure  3g ) and Attack I (see Figure 3i) respectively. In each figure of Figure 3 , a large gap is observed, clearly discriminating the DNN being attacked from the clean DNN.
In Figure 4 , we show the largest average MAMF (i.e. ρ * ) for both DNNs for all attack instances. Note the clear large difference between the two bars for each attack instance. Thus any detection threshold π in (0.6, 0.8), if used, could successfully detect whether the DNN is attacked. Moreover, for the DNN being attacked, for all attack instances, the class pair corresponding to the maximum average MAMF is precisely the true backdoor pair. Hence when a detection is made, the (source, target) class pair (used by the attacker) is also correctly inferred. Again, we address that our assumptions about the attack are more realistic for perceptible backdoors than the assumptions in NC that all classes other than the target class are involved in devising the attack. For the attack instances in our experiments (that use a single source class), NC is not expected to make a correct detection. We evaluate its performance in the Appendix as verification.
C. Verification of Property 2
Here we verify Property 2, the robustness property of perceptible backdoor patterns from two aspects. First, for each attack instance, we modify the backdoor pattern embedded into each clean test image (from the source class) by adding Gaussian noise N (0, σ 2 ) to each pixel (and then clipping each pixel value to [0, 1]). Second, instead of adding noise, we crop part of the backdoor pattern outside its center before embedding to the clean test images. We evaluate the attack success rate for noisy backdoor patterns with σ 2 = 0.1, 0.5, 1 and cropped backdoor patterns to 64% and 36% of the original size in Table II . For most of the attack instances, using noisy or cropped backdoor patterns at test time still achieves high attack success rate (even though cropping from the center of a backdoor pattern may remove critical features on the periphery of the backdoor pattern).
D. Number of Images for Detection
We note that if too few clean images are available to the defender, the performance of our detector could be affected. When there are no attacks, a false detection may be made since it is much easier to find a pattern that induces misclassification for a small group than for a larger one. This has been verified in [17] which studies TTE attacks, as a "universal" perturbation inducing group misclassification needs much larger norm (and full spatial support) than a perturbation inducing single-image misclassification at test time. In Figure 5 , we show the MAMF statistics for the class pair with the largest average MAMF for both DNNs of Attack A, with 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 and 200 clean images per class used for pattern estimation. When the number of clean images used for detection is greater than 10, there is a clear gap between the two curves for the DNN being attacked and its clean counterpart. But if fewer images are used for detection, the curve corresponding to the clean DNN approaches 1.0 more quickly, i.e. achieving a high group misclassification fraction becomes easier and requires a smaller spatial support. This is the same phenomenon as in Figure 3i for Attack I, where the curve for the clean DNN quickly achieves 1.0 as the support width for pattern estimation increases, since only 9 clean images are used for detection. Note, though, that our detector is successful even in this case -there is still a large gap between the curves.
In practice, for the purpose of evaluating the clean test accuracy of the DNN, the user should possess sufficient clean images from all classes. If not, we suggest to use a smaller detection threshold for compensation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a detector for perceptible backdoors, post-training. Our detection, inspired by two properties of perceptible backdoor patterns, is based on the maximum achievable misclassification fraction statistic. With an easily chosen threshold, our detector shows strong capability for a range of datasets and backdoor patterns.
Yet there are potential improvements to our detector that could be studied in the future. First, even for a DNN with relatively high test accuracy, there might be classes very similar to each other and with high class confusion; hence there might be a pattern found on a small spatial support that induces high group misclassification fraction for such a class pair. To avoid false detections, one may build knowledge of confusion matrix information into the detector. Second, the pattern estimation step in our detector is performed for all class pairs. When there are thousands of classes, a more efficient version of our detector is of great interest.
1) The backdoor pattern is embedded into the bottom left corner of all images.
2) The backdoor pattern is spatially randomly located in each image.
3) The backdoor pattern is embedded one row up from the bottom left corner of all images. 4) The backdoor pattern is embedded one column right of the bottom left corner of all images. Here we only focus on the spatial location of the backdoor pattern without considering whether the backdoor patterns are scene-plausible or not. The fraction (%) of images in each group that are (mis)classified to the target class prescribed by the attack are 99.7, 4.1, 47.8, 14.4, respectively. Clearly, only if the backdoor pattern during testing is located at the same place as during training, the backdoor image will be reliably (mis)classified to the target class. Hence fixing the spatial location of the backdoor pattern when creating backdoor training images largely degrades the power of the attack.
B. Location of the Spatial Support for Pattern Estimation
According to Property 1, the spatial invariance of the perceptible backdoor mapping, the location of the spatial support in the pattern estimation step can be arbitrarily chosen. In the paper, we fixed the spatial support location to cover the top left corner for all clean images used for detection. Here, we experimentally verify that such choice is not critical to our detection.
We consider the same DNN being attacked and the same clean benchmark DNN under Attack B. We apply the same detection to both DNNs except that the spatial support for detection is fixed to cover 1) the top right corner, 2) the bottom left corner, 3) the bottom right corner of all clean images used for detection. In Figure 6 , for each location of the spatial support, we show the L maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistics for the class pair with the largest average MAMF, for both DNNs. In each figure, we observe a large gap between the two curves, indicating that the DNN being attacked could be easily detected for a large range of thresholds.
C. Performance Evaluation of NC
We evaluate NC for the attack instances A-I. As mentioned in the paper, NC jointly estimates a pattern and an associated mask for each putative target class to induce at least φ-level misclassification [25] . The optimization problem solved for pattern estimation relies on the choice of the penalty multiplier λ (for the L1-regularization of the mask) and the training settings. We used the Adam optimizer with the parameters suggested by the authors of NC and performed mini-batch optimization for a sufficient number of epochs (until convergence). If λ is too large, φ-level group misclassification can be achieved at the beginning, but the actual group misclassification fraction quickly reduces, since the mask "size" is over-penalized. If λ is too small, high group misclassification fraction will be maintained, but the L1 norm of the mask is unreasonably large. Hence we carefully adjust λ and the training parameters for each attack instance to achieve a mask with small L1 norm and a pattern inducing a high group misclassification fraction. For all the attack instances, we set φ = 0.9, and the optimization is performed for 200 epochs. The number of clean images per class used for detection, the choice of λ, the learning rate and the batch size for each attack instance are shown in Table III .
The detection inference of NC uses an "anomaly index" derived based on MAD [9] of the L1 norm of the mask for all putative target classes [25] . If the anomaly index is larger than 2, a detection is made with 95% confidence. In Figure 7 , we show the anomaly indices for both the DNN being attacked and the clean DNN for each attack instance. Only for Attack B and Attack G, NC successfully detects the attack -for both of these two attacks, there is a pattern and an associated relatively small mask, when applied to clean test images from all classes other than a target class, that induces a high group misclassification. This phenomenon is identified in [26] as "collateral damage"; that is, when the attack involves a single source class, it is possible to induce a misclassification to the target class when the backdoor pattern is added to a class other than the source class or the target class -the classifier's decision is made mainly based on the presence of the backdoor pattern but not the actual object of interest of the class. 
